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PREVIEW; State v. Christensen: Can Practitioners, in the Face 
of the Opioid Epidemic, be Convicted for Distribution of 
Dangerous Drugs Under Montana Law?  
 
Holly C. Suek* 
 
 The Montana Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral 
argument in this matter on Friday, April 3, 2020, at 9:30 a.m. in the 
Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek 
Justice Building, Helena, Montana. The oral arguments are closed 
to the public but will be available via live stream on the Court’s 
website.1 Assistant Attorney General C. Mark Fowler is likely to 
appear for the Appellee and Joshua S. Van De Wetering is likely to 




 The threshold issue of this case is one of statutory 
interpretation and applying the law to the case of a physician; the 
necessary approach for respecting and adhering to the separation of 
powers of the judicial and legislative branches.  This case presents 
the issue of whether a “practitioner,” here, a licensed physician, may 
be convicted of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs under 
Montana law for his prescribing practices.2 The Montana Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Montana criminal distribution statute,3 
as applied to physicians, will have important implications in the 
future for application in the courts, including possibly calling for the 
Legislature to pass new legislation. In conjunction, this case also 
presents the issue of whether the district court fully and fairly 
instructed the jury on drug distribution under Montana law when the 
court modeled the instructions after the Ninth Circuit due to the lack 
of precedent at the state level.4 
 
 
* Holly C. Suek, J.D./M.B.A. Candidate 2020, Alexander Blewett III School 
of Law at the University of Montana. 
1 http://stream.vision.net/MT-JUD/ 
2 See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 2, State v. Christensen (Mont. July 17, 
2019) (No. DA18-0268); Appellee’s Response Brief at 1, State v. Christensen 
(Mont. Jan. 21, 2020) (No. DA 18-0268). 
3 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–9–101 (2019). 
4 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 3; Appellee’s Response Brief, 
supra note 1, at 1.  
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 Although this preview focuses on the above-mentioned 
issues, there are a handful of other issues being raised on appeal, 
including: whether Montana’s criminal endangerment statute5 is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to physicians prescribing 
controlled substances; whether the district court erred when the 
court admitted character evidence without holding a 404(b) 
evidentiary hearing; whether the court erred in refusing the defense 
to put on character witnesses in order to present a complete defense; 
and whether the State presented enough evidence to convict 
Christensen, the appellant-practitioner.6  
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 2011 marked the beginning of Chris Arthur Christensen’s 
work as a physician in Florence Montana, where he operated as a 
general practice, with some focus placed on services for pain 
management through prescribing controlled substances.7 In 2014 
local, state, and federal authorities conducted a search of 
Christensen’s clinic and home pursuant to search warrants, and 
obtained 4,718 patient files.8 These files revealed Christensen’s 
prescribing practices, including his review of prior medical records, 
extent of examinations of his patients before prescribing, monitoring 
of patients and where his patients geographically were from.9 
 
 On August 19, 2015, the State charged Christensen with 396 
drug related crimes including charges of criminal distribution of 
dangerous drugs, criminal possession of dangerous drugs, criminal 
endangerment, and negligent homicide.10 The charges were 
amended in October 2017, to 11 counts of criminal distribution, nine 




5 MONT. CODE. ANN. § 45–9–102 (2019). 
6 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 3; Appellee’s Response Brief, 
supra note 1, at 1.  
7 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 3; Appellee’s Response Brief, 
supra note 1, at 2.  
8 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 2–3.  
9 Id. at 3. 
10 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 3. 
11 Id. at 4.  
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 The trial focused on 11 of Christensen’s patients; nine were 
present and testified, and two are deceased.12 Christensen wrote 
prescriptions for the 11 patients, with many of the prescriptions 
being for opiates, which are Schedule II controlled substances 
(dangerous drugs).13 After a four week trial, ending November 20, 
2017, the jury convicted Christensen on all counts and the district 
court later sentenced him to 20 years in Montana State Prison, with 
ten years suspended.14 Christensen now appeals the decision of the 
Montana Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, and 
his sentence was stayed pending the outcome of this appeal.15  
  
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
A. Appellant’s Argument 
 
 Appellant argues Christensen cannot be prosecuted under 
Montana’s criminal distribution of dangerous drugs statute for two 
reasons: (1) the statute provides an exemption for practitioners 
acting in the course of a professional practice, which Appellant 
contends Christensen was doing; and (2) the distribution statute does 
not apply to the action of prescribing, because the definitions of 
“distribution,” “sell,” “barter,” “exchange,” or “give away” do not 
equate to, or encompass prescribe.16 Appellant does not argue that 
physicians can never be prosecuted, just not for prescribing.17 
Additionally, if a practitioner engages in distribution actions of 
dangerous drugs outside of their professional practice, they may be 
criminally liable.18 
 
 Appellant asserts Montana’s criminal distribution of 
dangerous drugs statute differs from the applicable federal law 
under the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).19 To the same end, 
Appellant argues the district court erred when it modeled jury 
 
12 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 3. 
13 See generally Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 9–15; MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 50–32–202 (2019); Id. § 50–32–224. 
14 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 4.  
15 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 2. 
16 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 19–22. 
17 Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2, State v. Christensen (Mont. March 13, 2020) 
(No. DA18-0268). 
18 Id. 
19 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2018). 
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instructions from United States v. Feingold,20 a Ninth Circuit case 
applying federal law.21 Additionally, even if modeling its jury 
instructions after the Ninth Circuit’s was proper, the district court 
did not “fully” instruct the jury because the court did not give an 
instruction on heightened mens rea—intent—as required by the 
Ninth Circuit.22 Rather, the Appellant argues the district court only 
instructed on the lesser standard, “knowingly.”23  
 
B. Appellee’s Argument 
 
The State argues the distribution statute applies to 
physicians—and to Christensen in particular—because Christensen 
was not acting in the course of a professional practice when he 
prescribed dangerous drugs, “freely and liberally . . . at the victims’ 
choices and whims.”24  
 
Addressing jury instruction concerns, the State asserts the 
jury instructions applying to criminal distribution were full and fair, 
regardless of whether every Feingold principle was instructed on 
within one instruction, or if the applicable law of the case at issue is 
covered when the instructions are read together as a whole.25 The 
State argues the jury was instructed to convict Christensen under 
criminal liability—which requires heightened mens rea—and not 
under the lesser civil malpractice showing.26 The State refers to Jury 
Instruction No. 24,27 which directed the jury on the “good faith” 
defense, “that it must find that if the prescribing practitioner had a 
legitimate medical purpose, as defined not only by the 
‘practitioner’s sincere intent towards his patient’ but also by the 
practitioner’s ‘honest effort to prescribe for a patient’s condition in 
accordance with the standard of medical practice,’” then the 




20 454 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2006). 
21 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 17. 
22 Id. at 40. 
23 Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 16, at 8. 
24 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 8, 39.  
25 Id. at 17.  
26 Id. at 14–16.  
27 See Id. at 14. 
28 Id. at 15. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
 
A. Applicability of Mont. Code Ann. § 45–9–101 to 
Practitioner Prescribing 
 
 The Montana Supreme Court’s decision will likely turn on a 
threshold inquiry of whether the criminal distribution of dangerous 
drugs statute contemplates the act of “prescribing.” If the Court 
decides prescribing is within the scope of the statute, the next 
inquiry will likely be whether all practitioners are exempt from the 
statue, or instead, only those practitioners “acting in the course of a 
professional practice.” The parties disagree on the interpretation of 
the statute. 
 
 Under the general principles of statutory interpretation, the 
Montana Supreme Court will not, “insert that which the legislature 
omitted, nor [will it] omit that which the legislature has inserted.”29 
Appellee argues the statute is clear and the only inquiry necessary is 
whether Christensen was acting in the course of a professional 
practice when he prescribed dangerous drugs to his patients.30  
 
 Even if the Montana Legislature “borrowed heavily” from 
the CSA for guidance in drafting controlled substance statutes—as 
argued by the State—differences between the CSA and Montana’s 
criminal distribution statute exist.31 Importantly, the CSA does not 
limit the prohibited acts solely to acts under the umbrella of 
“distribute,” as the Montana criminal distribution statute does.32  
 
 In contrast to the Montana criminal distribution statute, the 
CSA makes it unlawful, “for any person knowingly or intentionally 
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense . . . a controlled 
substance.”33 The word “dispense” is not incorporated in the 
Montana criminal distribution statute. Furthermore, the words 
“distribute” and “dispense” are defined as separate from one another 
 
29 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 21 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 1–2–101 (2019)).  
30 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra at 8. 
31 See Id. at 8–9 (citing State ex rel. Lance v. Dist. Court, 542 P.2d 1211 
(1975); State v. Pirello, 282 P.3d 662 (2012)).  
32 See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–9–101 (2019). 
33 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (emphasis added). 
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in the Montana statutory scheme.34 The “dispense” definition 
encapsulates prescribing, whereas “distribute” does not.35 
 
  Since instructional legislative history on the statute is 
nonexistent, the Court may agree with the Appellant and decide the 
act of prescribing is not contemplated in the Montana distribution 
statute. In that case, Christensen (or any practitioner) may not be 
convicted for his actions of prescribing under the statute’s current 
language. Thus, under this interpretation the Court will dismiss 
Christensen’s 11 convictions for distribution of dangerous drugs for 
his actions of prescribing. The implications of this interpretation 
require legislative action, as the Court is unable to insert “prescribe” 
into the statute. If the Montana legislature intends to criminalize 
actions by physicians for prescribing for non-legitimate purposes, 
the legislature may do so by passing new legislation for prescribing 
or dispensing, as other states have recently done.36 
 
 Alternatively, should the Court agree with the State, such a 
decision would seem to necessarily imply the act of prescribing falls 
within the definition of one or more of the following: “distribution,” 
“sell,” “barter,” “exchange,” or “give away,” as laid out in the 
Montana criminal distribution statute.  If so, the Court also must 
determine whether Christensen’s prescribing efforts were within the 
course of his professional practice. Although the phrase “within the 
course of professional practice” in the Montana distribution statute 
is not defined, it was modeled after the CSA. Thus, the Court might 
look to both state and federal law for guidance.37 Additional 
guidance may be gleaned from 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04, providing that 
 
34 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–9–101(a); Id. § 50–32–101(10) “‘Dispense’ 
means to deliver a dangerous drug. . .by or pursuant to the lawful order of a 
practitioner, including prescribing, administering. . .” (emphasis added); Id. § 50–
32–101(12) “‘Distribute’ means to deliver other than by administering or 
dispensing a dangerous drug” (emphasis added). 
35 Id. 
36 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 30–31; see Id. at 23–24.  
37 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 26; e.g. U.S. v. Moore, 423 U.S. 
122, 123–124 (1975) (The issue presented was whether a person who are 
registered under the CSA can be prosecuted under 21 U.S.C. § 841 for dispensing 
or distributing controlled substances. Additionally, the Court said, “the scheme of 
the CSA, viewed against the background of the legislative history, reveals an 
intent to limit a registered physician’s dispensing authority to the course of his 
‘professional practice.”).   
2019  PREVIEW: State v. Christensen 87 
a practitioner shall be subject to penalties relating to controlled 
substances if the prescriptions were written and issued without a 
legitimate medical purpose.38 
 
B. Criminal Distribution & the Practitioner Exception Jury 
Instructions 
 
  Beyond the threshold issue of statutory applicability, the 
Court’s decision of whether the district court fully and fairly 
instructed the jury on each element of the crimes presented will 
hinge on the determined appropriate mens rea. Despite the Montana 
criminal distribution statute not mentioning “good faith,” was the 
district court required to instruct on such; if so, did they? 
 
 The mens rea requirement is connected to the practitioner 
exception language of the statute—acting inside the course of a 
professional practice. Christensen puts significant weight on the 
need to provide a jury instruction on intent (for acting outside of the 
course of a professional business).39 “Good faith” and “intent” in 
this instance go hand-in-hand. The Ninth Circuit, whom the district 
court relied upon, required instructions on “good faith” to ensure if 
a jury rendered a conviction, they did so after contemplating the 
heightened mens rea requirement and not just the lesser requirement 
for malpractice standard.40 The parties disagree as to whether the 
district court gave (an) instruction(s) for “intent” or “good faith.”41   
 
 The Court will determine if the jury instructions on criminal 
distribution were fully and fairly given, regardless of whether the 
word “intent” was used.  It would be improper for the Court to judge 
 
38 Feingold, 454 F.3d at 1003–04; “Thus, a physician remains criminally liable 
when he ceases to distribute or dispense controlled substances as a medical 
professional, and acts instead as a ‘pusher’” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
39 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 43–45. 
40 Id. at 41–43; “A controlled substance is distributed by a practitioner in the 
usual course of his professional practice if the substance is distributed by him in 
good faith in medically treating a patient. Good faith is not merely a practitioner’s 
sincere intention towards the people who come to see him, but, rather, it involves 
his sincerity in attempting to conduct himself in accordance with a standard of 
medical practice generally recognized and accepted in the country.” Id. at 42–43.  
41 Id. at 44; Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 14–15. 
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a jury instruction in isolation. Rather, the Court should determine if 
the instructions, as a whole, state the applicable law of the case.42  
 
 Although district courts are given broad discretion when 
instructing the jury, the Court may find the district court did not fully 
and fairly instruct the jury on criminal distribution of dangerous 
drugs if the Court determines the given instructions, “prejudicially 
affect the defendant’s substantial rights.”43 The implication of that 
finding is reversible error.44  However, the Court cannot find the 
instructions prejudicial if read in their entirety, the set of jury 
instruction state the applicable law of the case and crimes at hand.45   
 
 Alternatively, the Court may determine that any 
“imprecision” of the jury instructions was harmless and uphold the 
convictions for distribution. Any imprecision would be evident in 
the word choice of the instructions; thus, the Court will look to 
whether the words used instructed the jury to consider Christensen’s 
mental state, and if “purposely and knowingly” is sufficient for 




 The Court will likely dismiss Christensen’s convictions 
under the criminal distribution of dangerous drugs statute because 
his actions of prescribing controlled substances is not within the 
bounds of the definition of “distribution.”  Additionally, for future 
similarly situated practitioners engaged in the act of prescribing, 
they would not be susceptible to conviction under the statute as 
written. Although case law and legislative history is sparse or 
nonexistent on the matter, the Court’s decision will likely be 
justified by adherence to the strict rules of statutory interpretation 
and by applying the plain meaning of the words used in the statute. 
 
 Alternatively, if the Court does not dismiss Christensen’s 
criminal distribution convictions based on statutory interpretation, 
 
42 See Tarlton v. Kaufman, 199 P.3d 263, 267 (2008). 
43 State v. Williams, 358 P.3d 127, 129 (2015) (internal citations omitted). 
44 Id.  
45 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 18. 
46 The State argues the words “purposely and knowingly” were used in order 
to “wed” the relied upon federal jury instructions to the Montana law. Id. at 16. 
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the convictions will likely stand because the jury was fully and fairly 
instructed on the law of the case, although these types of instructions 
go beyond existing Montana law.  
 
 Lastly, Christensen’s other convictions—negligent 
homicide and criminal endangerment—are outside the purview of 
this preview. 
 
